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end.64 However, the New Jersey Solid Waste Act and the Hackensack
decision upholding it may impel the federal courts toward the enuncia-
tion of a new statement on this statute and others that represent a chal-
lenge to the plenary federal commerce powers and toward the invali-
dation of any environmental protection provision that erects a
discriminatory barrier against other states. The only other alternative
may be a beginning of the "ecological Balkanization" of this country
similar to "the intolerable experience of the economic Balkanization of
America that existed in the colonial period and under the Articles of
Confederation" 5-the situation the commerce clause was designed to
eliminate.
IRA STEVEN LEFTON
Constitutional Law-:-Conditions of Confinement for
Administratively Segregated Prisoners
It is common for prisoners subjected to segregation or solitary
confinement to lose many privileges and rights accorded the general
inmate population. The federal courts in recent years have often de-
fined and protected constitutional rights of inmates placed in segrega-
64. A bill to amend the Solid Waste Disposal Act of 1965 was introduced in the
House of Representatives in 1975 and was designed to oblige each state to adopt a state-
wide waste management and resource recovery program implementing, among other ob-
jectives: "(10) interstate co-operation in waste management and resource recovery, and
(11) consistency of waste management and resource recovery with Federal, state, and
local air and water pollution control, noise control, land use, and other environmental
policies and regulations." H.R. 5487, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. pt. I, § 251 (1975). As
hearings on the bill reveal, however, even these proposed amendments would not have
resulted in an increased federal role in the area preempting the states from taking action
on their own. Such state action would still be permitted and therefore could continue
to result in provisions that, like the New Jersey Waste Act, make no effective contribu-
tion to the national effort to deal with the solid waste situation. Thus in response to
a query as to the desirability of areawide, rather than state-by-state approaches, the bill's
sponsor, Rep. Paul G. Rogers, declared, "Well, I think this is commendable, and I think
this should be encouraged. Areawide planning would be encouraged under section
255(b) of my bill, unless the state decides-as Connecticut has-to establish and oper-
ate a statewide plan." Hearings on H.R. 5487 Before the Subcomm. on Transportation
and Commerce of the House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 94th Cong.,
1st Sess. 101 (1975).
65. American Can Co. v. Oregon Liquor Control Comm'n, 15 Or. App. 618, 628,
517 P.2d 691, 696 (1973).
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tion for "disciplinary" or "punitive" purposes but have less frequently
considered rights of inmates segregated for "administrative" purposes.
In Sweet v. South Carolina Department of Corrections,1 an inmate who
had been held in administrative segregation for five years for protection
from assault by other inmates claimed denial of equal protection of the
law and imposition of cruel and unusual punishment in that his living
conditions were not comparable to those of the general inmate popula-
tion. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, however, ruled that
the lack of ordinary privileges, particularly full exercise and shower
opportunities, would implicate constitutional rights only if plaintiff's
health had been impaired as a consequence of such deprivation or if the
deprivation were not necessitated by prison security and order.2
Plaintiff Sweet was voluntarily placed in administrative segregation
in 1968 following threats of violence by other inmates, who apparently
suspected that plaintiff had been giving information to prison officials.3
Sweet filed suit under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 in federal district court
against the Department of Corrections and its director requesting in-
junctive and monetary relief for unconstitutional imposition of cruel and
unusual punishment and for denial of equal protection. He claimed he
was given insufficient food, exercise and shower time, opportunity to
work, medical attention, reading and writing materials, and opportunity
to converse with other inmates.4 He also claimed that he was denied
freedom to exercise his religion and to confer with counsel, and that
prison officials failed to investigate his complaints.5 The conditions of
his administrative segregation, he argued, resembled those of prisoners
in punitive segregation despite the fact that his segregation was caused
by other inmates' threats rather than by his own misconduct.
After an evidentiary hearing, the district court dismissed the com-
plaint.6 The court of appeals, sitting en banc, found no factual basis for
many of the claims and ruled that other clear deprivations were neces-
sary as a practical matter in the maintenance of prison order and
1. 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir. 1975) (en bane).
2. Id. at 866.
3. The record is unclear about the reason for these threats. Both appellant and
appellee noted in their briefs that Sweet had given some sort of information to officials.
Brief for Appellant at 2; Brief for Appellee at 5.
4. 529 F.2d at 859.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 857.
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security and were thus constitutional. The court noted, however, that
the district court had not considered evidence of the effect on Sweet's
health of only two showers and two one-hour exercise periods per week
for an indefinite period of time.7 The court of appeals affirmed the dis-
missal of the monetary claims and remanded to the district court for
consideration of the health issue and the practicality of injunctive relief.'
Three appellate judges concurred, adding that inmates in protective
segregation should, so far as possible, be treated like the general inmate
population without regard to the expense involved.9 The concurring
judges further stated that the warden should be required to submit a
plan for protecting Sweet without imposing deprivations and that if he
were unable to do so, an independent consultant should be retained to
report feasible changes in Sweet's treatment to the district court.10
Recent court decisions examining the rights of segregated prisoners
7. Id. at 866. The record from the evidentiary hearing before the district court
disclosed the following facts: (1) Sweet was given three full meals per day but was
perhaps denied extras by inmates who served the food and gave extras to others. (2)
Sweet had been allowed to work for a few brief periods, but his supervisor testified that
Sweet was removed because he could not get along with other inmates and because it was
unsafe for him to work in most places. (3) Sweet's cellblock was visited regularly by
medical technicians who reported serious cases to a doctor for further treatment. While
Sweet received no psychiatric treatment as such, prison records showed he had been seen
many times by the doctor and was scheduled for an operation to correct a disability in
his leg. (4) Sweet's cellblock was visited regularly by a chaplain who counseled inmates
and performed services privately for any inmate requesting such services and who also
provided writing materials to inmates on request. The chaplain testified that Sweet had
never asked him for anything but writing materials, which were provided. Officials
testified that it would be unsafe for Sweet to attend the prison's regular services and that
group services in the cellblock would be an unfair imposition on the privacy of other
inmates who would not want to be part of the services. The officials stated that group
services in an adjacent exercise yard were possible, but the chaplain felt that they would
be undesirable because the inconsistent outdoor services caused by the weather changes
would agitate the inmates. (5) Sweet admitted being given educational reading materi-
als, and, according to officials, other books were brought to the cellblock. (6) There
was no evidence of lack of legal consultation or investigation of Sweet's complaints. (7)
Officials testified that Sweet was denied the opportunity to converse with other inmates
because he was loud and he aggravated them. See Joint Appendix for Appellant and
Appellee at 22A, 45A, 69A, 73A, 74A, 79A, 164A-75A, 183A-94A, 204A-05A.
8. 529 F.2d at 866. The majority opinion was written by Judge Russell and
joined in by Chief Judge Haynsworth and Judges Field and Widener. As to the
propriety of money damages, see generally United States v. Demko, 385 U.S. 149
(1966); United States v. Muniz, 374 U.S. 150 (1963); Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d
126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972); Note, Prisoners' Rights Under Section
1983, 57 GEo. LJ. 1270, 1290-97 (1969).
9. 529 F.2d at 866, 869. The concurring opinion was written by Judge Butzner
and joined in by Judges Craven and Winter.
10. Id. at 869.
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have evaluated procedures'" and official justifications 12 for placing in-
mates in segregation and the substantive conditions of segregated con-
finement. The Supreme Court and inferior federal courts have given
form to substantive rights relevant to segregated prisoners through the
first amendment as well as the fifth and fourteenth amendments' right of
access to counsel and the courts.' 3 While the Supreme Court has not
directly ruled on the many substantive conditions of segregated confine-
ment, the lower federal courts have had to address claims growing out of
various forms of prisoner deprivation. Even when an inmate is segre-
gated only briefly, the courts have enjoined unsanitary physical condi-
tions within segregation cells, 14 insufficient medical attention,'" or clear-
ly inadequate protection from other inmates. 16 When the period of
segregation is extended, courts have declared unconstitutional unjustifia-
11. E.g., Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974); Clutchette v. Procunier, 497
F.2d 809 (9th Cir. 1974), modified, 510 F.2d 613 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, 421
U.S. 1010 (1975); Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d 126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
885 (1975); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1049 (1972); Nolan v. Scafati, 430 F.2d 548 (1st Cir. 1970); Walker v. Mancusi, 338 F.
Supp. 311 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), afrd, 467 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1972); Landmann v. Royster,
333 F. Supp. 621 (E.D. Va. 1971); Jackson v. Bishop, 268 F. Supp. 804 (E.D. Ark.
1967), vacated & remanded, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968).
12. E.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
1049 (1972); Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971); Davis v. Lindsay,
321 F. Supp. 1134 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). See generally Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962); 60 AM. JUR. 2d Penal and Correctional Institutions § 46 (1972).
13. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416
U.S. 396 (1974); Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319 (1972) (per curiam); Johnson v. Avery,
393 U.S. 483 (1969); Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964) (per curiam). These cases
did not deal directly with segregated inmates. But cf. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519
(1972) (per curiam) (dismissal of pro se complaint); Brooks v. Florida, 389 U.S. 413
(1967) (per curiam) (involuntary confession).
14. E.g., McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859
(1975); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Wright v. McMann, 460 F.2d
126 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 885 (1972); Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857
(D.R.I. 1970) (mem.).
15. E.g., cases cited note 14 supra.
16. E.g., McCray v. Sullivan, 509 F.2d 1332 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 859
(1975); Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291 (5th Cir. 1974); Holt v. Sarver, 442 F.2d 304
(8th Cir. 1971). The Fourth Circuit in Sweet relied on an earlier case in which a
nonsegregated inmate claimed he was being unconstitutionally deprived of protection
from inmate violence. In Woodhous v. Virginia, 487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973), plaintiff
was in danger of assault, apparently in reprisal for aiding a younger prisoner who was
being sexually molested by other inmates. The lower court, after a hearing, dismissed
his complaint which alleged that he was being unconstitutionally deprived of protection
from inmate violence. 487 F.2d at 889. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reversed and remanded, holding that the plaintiff need not show past attacks or fear of
attack on his person. Plaintiff could establish cruel and unusual punishment if there
were a pervasive risk of harm from other inmates and if the prison officials were not
exercising reasonable care to protect him. Id. at 890.
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ble deprivations involving food, exercise, reading and writing materials,
and isolation from human contact.'
7
In a leading case, Sostre v. McGinnis,8 a federal district court held
unconstitutional punitive segregation in excess of fifteen days when the
prisoner was subject to deprivations including a limit of one hour per
day of exercise and one shower per week. 9 The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit reversed, concluding that the prisoner's indefinite
segregation was constitutional for the following reasons: (1) there
was no evidence of actual impairment of his own physical or mental
health and (2) there was conflicting evidence on the ordinary effects of
such segregation on health.' The court also noted that plaintiff could
secure his release from segregation by agreeing to obey prison rules.2 '
In Spain v. Procunier,2 2 prisoners held in "administrative" segrega-
tion for four years pending disposition of criminal charges arising from
the murders of prison guards and inmates brought suit alleging cruel
and unusual punishment. In addition to the usual deprivations accom-
panying segregation that were present in Sweet and Sostre, plaintiffs
were denied any outdoor exercise, were bound in neck chains for all out-
of-cell movements, and occasionally were removed from their cells with
17. Relevant to Sweet are recent opinions suggesting that solitary confinement of
unlimited duration is per se unconstitutional. E.g., O'Brien v. Moriarty, 489 F.2d 941,
944 (1st Cir. 1974) (dictum); Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178, 207-09 (2d Cir. 1971)
(Feinberg, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
As to specific deprivations, see, e.g., Sostre v. McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.
1971) (en banc), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972); Pugh v. Locke, 406 F. Supp. 318,
332 (M.D. Ala. 1976); Berch v. Stahl, 373 F. Supp. 412 (W.D.N.C. 1974); Rhem v.
Malcolm, 371 F. Supp. 594, 627 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Osborn v. Manson, 359 F. Supp. 1107
(D. Conn. 1973); Lollis v. New York State Dep't of Social Serv., 322 F. Supp. 473
(S.D.N.Y. 1970); ABA COMM'N ON CORRECTIONAL FACILITIES & SERV., SURVEY OF
UNITED STATES IMPLEMENTATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS STANDARD MINIMUM RULES
FOR THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS 17-18, 51 (1974) [hereinafter cited as UN STANDARD
RULES] (noting that South Carolina adopted the Rules by executive order and reported
full compliance with rule requiring one hour of exercise per day); AMERICAN CORREC-
TIONAL ASS'N, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 402-03, 408-20 (3d ed. 1966)
(providing for daily exercise for segregated prisoners); M. HERMANN & M. HEFT,
PRISONERS' RIGHTS SOURCEBOOK 113-23 (1973); L. ORLAND, JUSTICE, PUNISHMENT,
TREATMENT 259 (1973) (quoting CONN. DEP'T OF CORRECTION, POLICY DIRECTIVE ON
DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES) (providing for a minimum of two showers per week);
Annot., 18 A.L.R. FED. 7 (1974); Annot., 51 A.L.R.3d 111 (1973); 60 AM. JuR. 2d
Penal and Correctional Institutions §§ 44-52 (1972).
18. 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'g Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863
(S.D.N.Y. 1970), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1049 (1972).
19. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
20. 442 F.2d at 193-94 n.24.
21. Id. at 193.
22. 408 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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tear gas.23  There was conflicting evidence as to the effect these depriva-
tions were having on plaintiffs' health.24 The federal district court held
that this combination of conditions was unconstitutional and singled out
the use of tear gas (except in riot situations) and neck chains as
unconstitutional corporal punishment.2 5  The court gave injunctive
relief including an order that plaintiffs be permitted one hour per day of
outdoor exercise five days per week, weather permitting, except in
emergencies. 2 ' The order was issued despite recognition by the court
that its holding would require extensive construction of new facilities
and the hiring of new personnel.
Disciplinary segregation is used as a means of discipline or punish-
ment or as a means of protecting guards or other inmates.2 8  Adminis-
trative segregation, on the other hand, is used for many categories of
inmates: those in need of protection from other inmates, those await-
ing disciplinary hearings or resolution of criminal proceedings, those
who are mentally ill, those awaiting transfer to another institution, and
occasionally those who are simply deemed dangerous to themselves,
guards, or other inmates. 29  In Wolff v. McDonnell,30 the Supreme
Court held that inmates are entitled to a due process hearing prior to
placement in disciplinary segregation; such hearings, however, have not
been generally required by lower courts for nondisciplinary administra-
tive segregation. 3 ' The inmate who needs protection may be placed in
23. Id. at 541-45.
24. Id. at 538, 546.
25. Id. at 545.
26. Id. at 547.
27. ld. at 537.
28. For example, the Federal Bureau of Prisons' policy is that "lain inmate may
be placed in disciplinary segregation when his continued presence in the general
population poses a serious threat to himself, staff, or other inmates or to the security of
the institution" and when "the inmate has been found to have committed a serious
violation of institution rules or regulations." BUREAU OF PRISONS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, POLICY STATEMENT: INMATE DISCIPUNE, No. 7400.5D at 4 (July 7, 1975).
29. Use of administrative segregation to house inmates who are a threat to other
inmates or guards has blurred the distinctions between administrative and disciplinary
segregation. See, e.g., Spain v. Procunier, 408 F. Supp. 534 (N.D. Cal. 1976); United
States ex rel. Walker v. Mancusi, 338 F. Supp. 311 (W.D.N.Y. 1971), ajI'd, 467 F.2d 51
(2d Cir. 1972); Urbano v. McCorkle, 334 F. Supp. 161 (D.N.J. 1971); L. ORLAND,
supra note 17, at 258 (quoting CONN. DEP'T OF CORRECTION, POLICY DmETInVE ON
DISCIPLINARY PROCEDURES); McAninch, Penal Incarceration and Cruel and Unusual
Punishment, 25 S.C.L. Rnv. 579, 580 (1973). Officials in Sweet who testified about
uses of administrative segregation in South Carolina did not list this use.
30. 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
31. Hearings have been required when administrative segregation is used for
inmates who are a threat to other inmates or guards. See cases cited note 29 supra. For
other uses of administrative segregation, hearings have not been required. See, e.g.,
Young v. Wainwright, 449 F.2d 338 (5th Cir, 1971) (per curiam).
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administrative segregation by prison officials on their initiative or upon
request by the inmate.12  Although punitive segregation is usually of
shorter duration than administrative segregation, many experts criticize
the use of punitive segregation, whereas administrative segregation has
been generally approved.
33
Both the majority and concurring judges stressed that Sweet pos-
sessed a constitutional right to protection, and that under the circum-
stances, it was probably the officials' duty to honor his request for
protection.3 4 The entire court, therefore, apparently felt that a diminu-
tion of exercise and shower rights should not ideally condition access to
protective segregation. 5 However, while the majority held that consid-
erations of Sweet's health and prison order and security were necessary
to a ruling on constitutional issues,3 6 the concurring judges would
require only a finding that Sweet's treatment could feasibly be improved
without regard to the expense involved in such improvements. 7 The
concurring judges also made specific recommendations that Sweet be
transferred to another prison, that those who made the threats be
segregated instead of Sweet, or that extra guards accompany Sweet in
the general population.38
There are fundamental reasons why such broad constitutional prin-
ciples, when applied to the treatment of protected, segregated prisoners,
32. See generally cases cited notes 29 & 31 supra.
33. E.g., UN STANDARD RULES, supra note 17, at 40, 47 (under the Rules,
separation of prisoners should be used only for protection, treatment or for supervision
of the mentally abnormal); ANNUAL CHIEF JUSTICE EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON
ADVOCACY, A PROGRAM FOR PRISON REFORM 14 n.10 (1972); L. ORLAND, supra note 17,
at 249 (American Correctional Association policy is to prefer administrative segregation
over punitive segregation for long terms); id. at 353 (§ 3(d) of the Model Act drafted by
the National Council on Crime and Delinquency supports use of segregation only for the
protection of inmates and personnel, not for punishment). Extended solitary confine-
ment has been described as the "most widespread, controversial, and inhumane of current
penal practices. . . ." NATIONAL ADVISORY COMM'N ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS
AND GOALS, CORRECTIONS 32 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CoRuRcrIMONS].
34. 529 F.2d at 859, 867. See note 16 supra.
35. See 529 F.2d at 859, 867-69.
36. Deprivations of mental or physical health, whether intentionally inflicted or
not, are being recognized by corrections experts as unwarranted "corporal punishment."
See L. ORLAND, supra note 17, at 248-49; M. RICHMOND, PISON PROFILES 77, 90
(1965); Note, supra note 8, at 1286-87. See generally Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86
(1958).
37. 529 F.2d at 868. See Finney v. Arkansas Bd. of Correction, 505 F.2d 194, 201
(8th Cir. 1974) (lack of funds not an acceptable excuse for overcrowded prisons);
Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 580 (8th Cir. 1968) (rejecting claim by Arkansas
officials that the use of a strap was valid punishment due to the expense of constructing
then unavailable segregation facilities).
38. 529 F.2d at 869.
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do not adequately deal with present prison conditions. The courts, in
defining constitutional rights of prison inmates, have balanced the rights
of the imprisoned individual against the interests of the prison adminis-
tration. This balancing test fails analytically because it does not take
into account a crucial factor: the existence and nature of a unique
inmate society within prisons. 9 It is a totalitarian society often charac-
terized by idleness, boredom and inter-inmate hatred and violence;
relationships between inmates and guards or officials are less impor-
tant.40  Courts are capable of making informed judgments on the
constitutional rights of a prisoner as he interacts with the familiar world
outside of prison; however, the judiciary seems uncomfortable with the
task in cases in which the rights asserted involve the closed world within
prisons.4'
The court in Sweet did not adequately consider the fact that
plaintiff was suspected by other prisoners of violating one of the most
basic norms of inmate society by giving unsolicited information to
prison officials. An expected result of this supposed breach of trust is
unrelenting, potentially violent hatred directed toward the "informant"
by most of the inmate population.42 As experts acknowledge, prison
39. The writer's opinions on this issue are mostly a result of his experiences and
observations while confined in North Carolina youthful offender prisons in 1970. See
Note, supra note 8, at 1287 (cotirts should give credence to the human interactions
within the prison environment, which may make rehabilitation impossible). See also
Fulwood v. Clemmer, 206 F. Supp. 370 (D.D.C. 1962).
40. Lloyd Ohlin has described prison society as follows: "A prison is not a
collection of unrelated individuals. It is a highly organized system of roles, relation-
ships, rules and 'activities. The treatment preoccupation with individual offenders has
obscured the heavy impact of the prison organization on offenders, not as individuals but
as members of the social system." M. RICHMOND, supra note 36, at 131 (quoting L.
OHLIN, TARGETS FOR CHANGE IN CORRECTIONAL INsTITrUTIONS). See ANNUAL EARL
WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADVOCACY, supra note 33, at 47-56; L. ORLAND, supra note 17,
at 127, 153, 167-68, 173-76; U.S. DEP'T OF JuSrTcE, PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE IN
CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTIONS 16-17, 41 (1973) (a collection of papers presented at the
Fourth National Symposium on Law Enforcement Science and Technology).
41. Perhaps this explains the Supreme Court's reluctance to judge the constitution-
ality of many substantive conditions in this area. Access to counsel and the courts, and
visiting and correspondence privileges involve extenuated contacts with the outside world.
Conversely, discipline, protection, and classification of inmates are primarily internal
processes. See M. HERMANN & M. HEFT, supra note 17, at 114; Note, supra note 8, at
1281-82 n.80.
42. Joint Appendix for Appellant and Appellee at 14A-24A, 88A, 141A; Brief for
Appellant at 8, Sweet v. South Carolina Dep't of Corrections, 529 F.2d 854 (4th Cir.
1975). The officials testified that Sweet would be in danger regardless of who was in
the inmate population, even in twenty years, and that Sweet could not adapt to the prison
population due to a general inability to get along with other inmates. Id. See M.
RICHMOND, supra note 36, at 102 (cooperation and compliance with authority may lead
to an inability to take care of oneself).
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order is maintained at least partly through the consent of the inmates;4"
Sweet was thus probably as much a threat to order in the prison as an
inmate who was considered a "discipline" problem. The concurring
judges' recommendation that the officials isolate or transfer those who
threatened Sweet instead of segregating Sweet is unrealistic. Given the
severity of Sweet's supposed breach and the unanimity of inmate antago-
nism to such actions, many inmates would probably threaten Sweet.
This unanimity and the fact that inmate gossip is regularly passed from
prison to prison also make transfer of Sweet to another prison an unwise
administrative reaction unless inter-inmate contact and transfer of in-
mates were unusually rare between the two prisons."4
Additionally, the concurring judges oversimplified the problem by
suggesting that extra guards be assigned to Sweet as he interacted with
the general inmate population and by stating that the expense involved
in giving Sweet better treatment was irrelevant. Expense generally
dictates the levels of prison physical facilities, programs and personnel.45
While a court may limit mail censorship, for example, without directly
increasing prison expenses, most problems of internal management,
even when constitutional rights are involved, require that expense be
considered.4 6 Many prisoners suffer deprivations that are arguably
unconstitutional even when resources available to prisons are correctly
allocated.47 At the very least, any adjustment that necessitates realloca-
tion of resources to one prisoner will in some way deprive another. If
Sweet and other prisoners in administrative segregation were given more
exercise time, guards would probably have to be transferred to supervise
that inmate exercise, and the risk of escape or violence in other areas
43. U.S. DEP'T OF JUsTIcE, supra note 40, at 17-18.
44. Sweet was convicted of statutory rape. The Department of Corrections had a
policy of not allowing sex offenders in minimal security prisons. See UN STANDARD
RULES, supra note 17, at 15-16 (Rule 8, approving separation of inmates based on
criminal record). As a result there were only two institutions at which Sweet could be
kept; Sweet had already been at the other institution, where he had problems. Joint
Appendix for Appellant and Appellee at 7A, 16A. There is a solution under federal
statutes authorizing transfer of certain inmates between a state prison system and the
federal prison system. 18 U.S.C. §§ 4002, 5003, 5013 (1970). This alternative has
been employed for inmates threatened by other inmates.
45. See UN STANDARD RULES, supra note 17, at 53 (lack of resources at the heart
of most noncompliance with the Rules); N.C. PENAL SYS. STUDY COMM'N, N.C. BAR
ASS'N, INTmaM REPORT (1971) (finding that North Carolina is trying to operate a
twentieth-century system with nineteenth-century facilities).
46. See note 41 supra. Cf. Brief for Appellant at 32 (arguing particularly that
expenses cannot justify first amendment restrictions).
47. This is most obvious when basic resources such as housing are lacking. See
Spain v. Procunier, 408 F. Supp. 534, 537 (N.D. Cal. 1976); sources cited note 45 supra
and note 55 infra.
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would increase.48 An alternative solution worth consideration would be
to shift employees from education, training, and counseling to custodial
duties.49  However, it is likely that requests for administrative segrega-
tion (from inmates truly in fear of violence,"0 as well as those who might
like the rare privacy afforded by segregation) would increase far beyond
prison facility capabilities if such segregation were not accompanied by
a loss of some privileges. Some concomitant "deprivation" operates to
allocate the prison's scarce resources in such a way as to accommodate
the needs of inmates.
Nevertheless, official justification for prisoner deprivations based
on the necessity of prison order or on expense should be closely scruti-
nized by the courts. For example, the officials in Sweet testified that
they could not allow Sweet to exercise, work, or worship with the
general prison population because he would have to be accompanied
and protected by a guard on all occasions, but these officials contradict-
ed themselves by saying that, although they would not recommend it,
they would allow Sweet to move out of segregation and back into the
general prison population if he chose to do so.5' Considering the duty
of officials to take all reasonable precautions for Sweet's protection, 2 he
should probably be retained in administrative segregation even if he
desired to move back in the population. This apparent contradiction
should have been recognized, if not resolved, in Sweet.
The court was wise in remanding to the district court for further
fact-finding,53 and sensitive in its concern that long term segregation can
48. Prison officials in Sweet stated that religious services were once held in
plaintiffs cellblock but were discontinued due to a lack of personnel. They argued that
in order to double the showers and exercise time of the inmates in the cell block, it would
be necessary to double the number of guards assigned there during those periods. Joint
Appendix for Appellant and Appellee at 45A, 57A; Brief for Appellee at 7. Such a lack
of resources is widespread; given these scarcities, classification of inmates is argued as
the best means of allocating resources and in fact has that goal as its primary purpose.
CORRECTIONS, supra note 33, at 210; L. ORLAND, supra note 17, at 219. See also U.S.
DEP't of JUSTcE, supra note 40, at 16-17; Note, Constitutional Limitations on the
Conditions of Pretrial Detention, 79 YALE L.J. 941, 955 n.90 (1970).
49. This solution draws support from a recent realization by corrections experts
that "rehabilitation" does not usually occur in prisons and that emphasis is more properly
placed on providing humane conditions in prisons. See note 39 supra.
50. It has been said that to eliminate the possibility of violence, all detainees in
jails would have to be kept under maximum security. Note, supra note 48, at 955. Thus,
a doctrine that a prisoner has an absolute right to be free from harm seems impossible to
put into effect and therefore unwise. See Co.REqa oNs, supra note 33, at 32; Note,
supra note 8, at 1297.
51. Joint appendix for Appellant and Appellee at 159A.
52. See note 16 supra.
53. The Fourth Circuit thus required more serious consideration of the conditions
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impair physical and mental health. When such adverser effects on
health occur, the inmate's deprivations deserve special attention by the
courts.54 The success of such judicial entry into areas formerly con-
trolled by prisoners and administrators requires not only the courts'
sense of justice but also their ability and willingness to become familiar
with the strange society and the allocation of resources within prisons.55
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of administrative segregation than in Breedon v. Jackson, 457 F.2d 578 (4th Cir. 1972).
In that case, plaintiff was voluntarily placed in segregation to protect him from inmate
assaults. He claimed that as a result of segregation he was subjected to unconstitutional
deprivations including limited exercise and bathing opportunities and demanded mone-
tary relief. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's dismissal without a hearing
and concluded as a matter of law that there was no violation of the Constitution. 457
F.2d at 581.
In two recent cases involving suits brought by inmates in segregation, the Supreme
Court has reversed lower courts' dismissals without hearings. Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S.
319 (1972) (per curiam); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519 (1972) (per curiam).
The concurring judges in Sweet were realistic in recognizing the need for ascertain-
ing the informed advice of an independent consultant to suggest constitutionally accept-
able means of initiating effective segregated confinement. It is interesting to note that
South Carolina is one of the few jurisdictions with a formal prison inspection system.
UN STANDARD RULES, supra note 17, at 35.
54. The court's holding in Sweet was applied recently in Dorrough v. Hogan, No.
C74-1823A (N.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 1976). Plaintiffs filed a class action; they were being
held in administrative segregation and limited to two one-hour exercise periods a week.
After a full trial, the court entered an order allowing twenty more days before entering a
final ruling for parties to submit pleadings on the health and practicality issues. The
court expressed another concern:
This court tends to agree with the court in [Jordan v. Arnold, 408 F. Supp. 869,
876-77 (M.D. Pa. 1976)] when it held that a court order requiring daily ex-
ercise is appropriate when overall conditions are found to be substandard, but
that an order requiring the prison officials to merely change their exercise
schedule might be an unwarranted intrusion into an area governed by official
discretion.
No. C74-1823A, slip op. at 2.
55. See ANNUAL EARL WARREN CONFERENCE ON ADvOCACY, supra note 33, at 49,
53-59. Since the courts cannot force legislatures to appropriate more funds to prisons,
courts may be tempted to force quick changes by simply ordering the release of prisoners
held under unconstitutional conditions. See generally Morales v. Schmidt, 340 F. Supp.
544, 548-49 (W.D. Wis. 1972), rev'd, 489 F.2d 1335 (7th Cir. 1973); Hamilton v. Love,
328 F. Supp. 1182 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark.
1970), aff'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971).
